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An application of value-of-information to decision process reengineering
Abstract: Value of information (VOI) methods were used to guide changes to recurrent
organizational decision processes, under a reengineering effort at a major automobile
manufacturer to reduce supply and demand imbalances involving capacity for parts and
products. We modeled representative decisions assuming as they would be made with
and without the benefit of improved information flows, and calculated the resulting
increase in expected value. By factoring in the entire range of decisions affected by a
process change, we scaled the value of each organizational change to a life-cycle value.
The results quantified the impact of organizational changes in order to refine and
prioritize a portfolio of change projects.

1. Introduction
Value of change as value of information
This paper applies the decision analytic idea of value of information (VOI) to plan
improvements to an organization’s decision processes and information flows. The
theoretical idea of applying VOI to value information systems is well-known: for each
possible information system, model the decision maker’s information for each state of
nature information and calculate the expected value for relevant decisions. This is
difficult in practice, as often there are too many possible information systems or too
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many decisions to model. We successfully adapted techniques from decision analysis
(DA) in concert with a business process reengineering (BPR) effort to guide
improvements at General Motors.
Planning changes typically requires prospective performance measures (Sarkis et
al, 1997) and although information can be more nebulous than, say, materials handling,
there is a literature on analytic methods for evaluating prospective information systems.
The conceptual notion of using VOI (Raiffa, 1968) for this purpose is well-known (e.g.,
Vazsonyi 1976) and appears in standard management information systems textbooks
(e.g., Turban and Aronson 1997, pp. 567-568). Both Hilton (1981) and Demski (1972)
noted with disappointment the lack of practical applications of this concept. Such
applications are still hard to find, although there have been recent efforts to evaluate
(Kumar 1997, Khouja & Kumar 2002) decision support systems with regard to speed
and flexibility, and to consider their optimal design (Herrmann & Schmidt 2002). These
approaches are suitable when assessments for highly specific decisions and conditions
can be obtained and timing of specific decisions can be controlled, e.g., within automated
systems.
For simplicity, we shall use the terms P1 and P2 to denote the as-is process (the
process before changes) and the to-be process (with desirable improvements).
Under the as-is process, the decision maker assigns probability distributions (in
some cases deterministic assumptions) X|P1 for a set of parameters {X} such as the mean
and standard deviation of the forecast a specific product’s demand. P1 does not
necessarily represent the best information available within the company or make the best
use of available information. Let V(X) denote the expected value of decision  given
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the distribution X, and let (X) denote the decision that maximizes V(X). Under an
improved process, the decision maker assigns different probability distributions X|P2.
Since the purpose of changing a process is to remove sources of error found in the preexisting process, we assume P2 will be more reliable than P1. The question of interest is
not whether P2 is better than P1, but rather how much value this change adds and at what
cost. To measure this, we calculate the expected value for each alternative under P2 and
compare the value of the best alternative to the expected value (still calculated assuming
P2) of worse alternatives that might be selected under P1.1
The change in the probability distribution faced by the decision maker could arise
in various ways: different people (who have different information) could make the
decision; the same decision makers could receive different sources of information; the
decision could be made at a different point in time; or using different assumptions. We
call the value added in going from P1 to P2 the value of change (VOC). We define:
V1 = V((X|P1), X|P2),
V2 = V((X|P2), X|P2), and
VOC = V2-V1
Now, an important step is to relate VOC for real processes to the theoretical value
of information so that we can model both the P1 and P2 states. We can think of changes
1

To the extent that any technique embeds its own biases, it over-estimates the value of its

perceived optimal choice compared to other choices (Smith & Winkler 2006). In
calculating VOC, we made the implicit assumption that the new process would have
removed biases that might be present in the current process, but we recognized that
results should be interpreted with some caution.
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along the lines suggested by Keisler (1992), where a signal flowing through an advisor to
a decision maker may be improved in various ways as it is collected, processed, or
communicated. Such changes result in different situations for the decision maker. For
example,
1) P2 simply adds information to that from P1, thereby reducing uncertainty. In this case,
VOC is standard expected value of information. Where possible, we make
simplifying assumptions (e.g., normal distributions) so that we can calculate this
value only using summary statistics such as the mean and standard deviation of
forecasts under P1 and P2.
2) P2 eliminates some bias. In this case, ex-post VOI for a given decision is easily
calculated (i.e., reduction in expected loss), but using expected value of information is
less practical here as it would require assessing a distribution on the amount of bias.
3) P2 provides a more accurate depiction of the level of uncertainty. Here, VOC is
similar to Henrion & Morgan’s (1992) “expected value of including uncertainty,” or
alternatively, we might think of the ex-post value of improved information about a
variable’s as standard deviation or some other parameter.
Meeting challenges of this approach
In our application, the biggest challenge we faced was the sheer volume of
decisions and information involved. There could be much to model, many potential
interactions and many system alternatives.

Therefore, we needed to speed up the

modeling process, either by making fewer models, creating the models more quickly or
by making the models easier to populate. Equally important, just having a definition of
VOC and a list of decisions is not enough to calculate anything. We need ways to go

4

from managers’ verbal descriptions of their problems to something calculable.
Furthermore, if subjective judgments about what happens under P1 and P2 were needed, it
was unclear how to obtain them. Certain characteristics of VOI problems and certain
aspects of the information systems made these challenges manageable.
It would take impractically high analytic resources to create computational
models at the level of fidelity appropriate for making the underlying decisions we wished
to improve. One way around this problem is to aim for a lower level of fidelity. VOI
estimates for fixed problem structures are often only moderately sensitive to parameter
values near the optimum. For example, where two alternatives have almost the same
expected value, a small perturbation to one of them could drastically change the
allocation of resources, but value of information would remain nearly constant (see
Keisler, 2004a). This same notion applies again at the level of decisions about the
information system. The actual decision may be more sensitive to the precision of
estimates than is expected value. Thus, order-of-magnitude type facilitative models
(Soderquist, 2003) may be reasonable and useful if the purpose is to produce only value
of information and related results. In situations where we cannot know the actual
conditions of future decisions, this sort of sampling of the future decision space keeps the
modeling workload manageable.
If we were to obtain actual results, we needed to impose structure at several points.
The DA work and the BPR work were closely coordinated to support each other. For both
structuring models and estimating input values, we exploited GM’s base of experience,
research, computer models and written reports. With these resources, some judgments
required little more than a survey of existing data. To avoid difficult assessments, we
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structured VOC models to use such simple judgments, while further impacts on the
decision maker’s state of information were calculated.

2. Application
GM’s problem
In the mid and late 1990’s, General Motors (GM) suffered periodic imbalances
between production and demand for parts that it used in its family of products. For
example, a surge in demand for a new sporty version of a popular existing family car
could in turn lead to a surge in demand for rear spoilers. If, however, the company had
contracted for too few spoilers then it would have to sell more basic vehicles than sporty
vehicles. Some customers would be without their most desired product and substantial
discounting could be required to sell what was actually produced. Conversely, lower
demand for a product line or a whole class of products could lead to disproportionately
large overcapacity problems for certain parts. This would result in losses due to
contractual obligations, unnecessarily high upfront costs, and product discounting.
There was no easy solution – it would have been impractical to increase a
decision-maker’s workload by prescribing that they actively produce more precise
information and analysis for thousands of separate decisions. Instead, the goal was to
improve the match between the needs dictated by the overall decision stream and
information flow generated by the organization, i.e., the content, timing, definitions and
rules used for creating and distributing reports.
Using DA with BPR
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GM initiated a BPR effort with the management consulting firm Strategic
Decisions Group in order to align the related planning processes across the organization.
We discuss this BPR as background in order to set the broader context for our particular
DA work and because it seems to be a good starting point for this type of effort. Several
planning processes were embedded in other functions of the huge company, and hence
the charge for this effort was for major improvements of existing processes rather than
radical change that would eliminate many processes.
Our goal was to improve ongoing processes to support series of recurring similar
decisions. This meant assuring that decision makers would have available information of
sufficient quality and would make the best use of that information, i.e., that the company
would have a better information system (broadly conceived) for capacity planning. Key
to this was ensuring that once decisions, forecasts and comprehension of uncertainty were
available to one group, these would cascade consistently and quickly through the
organization. The timing of decisions could likewise be managed in order to exploit latearriving information by postponing commitments where reasonable. The fundamental
benefit of successful BPR would be a drastic reduction in financial losses due to
insufficient or excess production.
We needed to prioritize the portfolio of possible changes because there were
many of them and relatively few people to implement them. The company would benefit
if the changes with the highest payoff were completed first. We used DA techniques to
value changes in order to prioritize them. From the start, we viewed parts capacity
planning as a family of decisions and we collected qualitative data on it using BPR
methods. These data would frame the DA modeling. BPR was to generate and then
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implement specifications for individual projects to move the company from its current
(as-is) state to a desired (to-be) state (Manganelli and Hagen 2003).
Mapping the system
The first step of the BPR2 was as-is mapping. Because the engagement was
focused on improving decisions, mapping consisted of identifying all players
representing all related parts of the process and asking what decisions do you make, what
information do you produce, and what information do you use? If we had not asked about
each of these all along, the DA modeling that followed would have been much more
difficult. From these data, we physically mapped the pertinent existing information flows.
We posted the map and refined it as GM experts and stakeholders viewed and
responded to it. The map contained 29 nodes at which information was manipulated and
56 links between them. We reviewed the map with GM staff to identify gaps between the
information that was needed and what was provided. These gaps suggested potential
changes or change requirements (CRs). We were left with a complex but detailed picture
of the system. A greatly simplified version of a portion of this map, still giving a hint of
complexity, is shown in Figure 1. Out of 67 changes we ultimately considered and 20 that
we modeled, this figure highlights four of them. In the paper, we explain these four
changes in detail to illustrate the process we used to analyze many of them.
2

The larger BPR effort involved a process facilitation team of five people (two internal

GM managers, three external consultants) working closely with a core team of over
twenty GM information creators, users and managers, in turn reporting to a senior board
of key leaders.
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These changes generally consisted of connecting poorly linked points. “Poorly
linked” often meant that information relevant to a decision was available somewhere in
the organization, but the information was not readily available to the decision maker in
correct and usable form and in time to make the decision. Perhaps the decision was made
too soon, or a relevant report never reached the decision maker, or two decisions were
made independently (so that one decision maker just made a guess about what the other
would do) instead of in coordinated fashion. There was no one centralized organizational
unit that collated all information and made all decisions; rather, different decentralized
organizational units made decisions based on information they had available. There was
no appetite for a radical restructuring of the organization, so we mostly focused on
strengthening the existing weak links.

3. Working with change requirements
Initial definitions
We initially defined change requirements in terms that were natural for the users
of information. We review a few of these requirements and then discuss how we moved
toward modeling their value. We consider now the four CRs highlighted in Figure 1:
CR1 (industry and segment volume forecast) involved the formulation of vehicle
demand forecasts. These forecasts were prepared by GM’s Business Decision Support
Center (BDSC) and were then sent to GM’s North American Operations Portfolio
Planning and Capacity Planning office. This information was used for a variety of
production capacity decisions. The concern was that the forecasts erred not so much due
to lack of precise detail in forecasting, but due to lack of coordination and consistency
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between different subgroups. An obvious symptom of this problem was that different
groups actually used different forecasts. The definition of this CR was clear enough that
the implementation team, knowing the context, understood what problems the CR would
solve. But it was not at all obvious how to measure the impact of this requirement to
“ensure the right information is provided by the right functional area at the right time,
especially in areas [x, y and z].”
CR2 (production cost information) addressed the terms for contracting capacity
GM Purchasing reported to the vehicle level executive teams. These teams treated
capacity terms as fixed, and therefore did not consider how costs would vary in nonlinear fashion with volume, and built plans around a point-estimate forecast. GM
Purchasing actually had the ability to change contract terms. Ideally, Purchasing could
understand and communicate to vehicle level executive teams relevant threshold levels
that would cause suppliers to incur incremental tooling investment costs. Then these
teams could make plans that reflect the impact of demand uncertainty on cost.
CR3 (target volumes) stated that “BDSC needs to provide timely split information
to North American Operations Portfolio Planning and Capacity Planning on items that
have long term implications on (capacity decisions for) the Body Shop.” This included
split information on trucks (the percentage of different bed types, drive types, 3 vs. 4 door
vehicles, and lift gates vs. rear door designs) and vans. In the as-is process, planners
combined vehicle forecasts with generic split percentages (i.e., assuming the same
percentage of leather seats on vans as on trucks) rather than vehicle specific split
percentages because this information wasn’t available until later.
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CR4 (capacity analysis) addressed the need for a brand and body-style specific
distribution in capacity planning analysis. The as-is process used a common standard
deviation for all products, even though the company had discovered that forecasts for
new products had greater uncertainty. The risk assessment should include the distinctions
that represent the major sources of uncertainty.”
Most other CRs similarly modified the way that some information or rule applies
in some decisions, e.g. “Engineering Groups should not modify Vehicle Group plans or
build in contingency (to capacity levels) but they should be strictly compliant with stated
plans.” The CRs were thus easy to understand, but difficult to value.
Choosing which CRs to model
At core team meetings, we discussed which CRs to model in detail. This was an
iterative process. Out of 67 CRs, several were technical quick hits that did not require
modeling, others would interact with corporate operations well beyond the scope of our
effort, some involved organizational issues that would contribute to more efficient
operations but did not directly affect any easily identified decisions or parameters. About
half the CRs involved specific enough decisions and information that it was plausible to
obtain data and develop quantitative models. We listed pertinent questions that would
benefit from answers, and then identified twenty decisions tied to specific CRs where we
saw potential for quantitative models to provide answers. With unlimited resources, we
would have modeled each of them extensively. Instead, we considered which CRs were
hardest to prioritize and which ones could be improved with a better understanding of
their value drivers. For ten such CRs, we developed full quantitative VOC models using
spreadsheets and explicit judgments of experts outside of the process facilitation team.
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We analyzed ten other CRs less formally, still using spreadsheets to gain insight but not
seeking expert judgments or additional documentation. For the other CRs where it was
meaningful but less critical, we discussed but did not model how improved information
flow could lead to increased value in downstream decisions.
Common model structure for the capacity decision
We constructed a number of “quick and dirty” influence diagrams, using as
experts mostly members of the core team or other GM analysts. We refined influence
diagrams and decision tree models for several of the decision points. It helped that GM
had a strong history with DA (Kusnic & Owen, 1992). We could draw on archival
influence diagrams as well as a corporate forecasting template that used accounting
identities and pro-forma business case parameters such as market share and market size
(as in DA textbook examples, e.g., McNamee and Celona, 2001).
We realized that, because they related to supply/demand imbalances, many of the
decisions shared the common structure of the influence diagram shown in Figure 2.
Although we believe it is likely that in many organizations, sets of decision flows would
have their own common structures, it was still fortunate that we discovered one here. It
simplified the task of modeling numerous changes and made the models easy to compare.
Specifically, the decisions involved setting capacity or quantity supplied for some
product or part in the face of uncertainty about quantity demanded. Quantity demanded
(e.g., the “net option demand” node in Figure 2) was driven by different parameters for
different parts or options. It could often be derived hierarchically from either demand for
a given family of GM vehicles, demand for a version of that vehicle (e.g., 2-door), or
demand penetration for an option among buyers of that version of the vehicle. Profit

12

maximizing capacity levels would take into account contribution margins (both from
parts sold as options and from vehicle sales enabled by the availability of parts), as well
as fixed costs (e.g., tooling) associated with capacity.
We calculated the optimal decision (typically capacity, although we could easily
incorporate different decision variables into the same basic influence diagram) under the
given information for each process using critical fractiles or similar simple rules, and we
assumed normal or similarly tractable distributions. We then calculated the expected
corresponding value received for each case.
In some instances, we considered more than two possible information states, i.e.,
if there were multiple ways in which the CR might be implemented we estimated value of
information about more than one variable. Although we felt that most of the changes
could be modeled as independent, it was simple to modify multiple variables. This could
help identify interactions that make it worthwhile to cluster certain changes.
We model this capacity decision as a “newsvendor” problem (Arrow, et al 1951,
Hillier & Lieberman 2005) in that we view the relevant investments as creating a
perishable asset. Typically, GM spends money to configure durable assets from its
existing base (whose costs treat as sunk), e.g., buildings and general use machines, to
produce a specific parts and designs. The dedicated configuration (and related spending
on equipment such as dies) has little or no salvage value after the next major vehicle
update (or after the dies wear out). Alternatively, GM’s capacity decision can simply
result in a contract with a supplier that commits to make such capacity available at a
given cost.

13

In this case, rather than newspapers, capacity is what is purchased and used. The
expected additional contribution from the marginal unit of capacity is the product of its
contribution if used and the expected number of times it is used. This varies by vehicle
type, e.g., for demand a sporty car’s demand may drop sharply after the first year, while a
family sedan’s demand may relatively stable for a number of years. Capacity is added up
to the point at which the marginal unit’s expected contribution is less than or equal to its
cost. This point is the critical fractile of the demand distribution, where the probability of
demand exceeding capacity is equal to the ratio of cost to contribution margin. If, as we
typically assumed, demand follows a normal distribution, the critical fractile is simply
calculated and easily modified for different CRs. The critical fractile rule was
implemented in a spreadsheet template (Figure 3) and as described below.
Demand (D) is normally distributed with mean E(D) and standard deviation (D);
fD denotes the probability density function for D, and D denotes the cumulative
probability function for D.
Letting F denote fixed cost, K denote the capacity decision variable, and C denote
annualized cost per unit of capacity, we note that the total cost is equal to F + KC.
We let M denote the contribution margin (marginal profit for a unit that was
demanded, then produced and sold). When demand exceeds capacity (which happens
with probability 1-D) production is fixed at the capacity level. When demand is below
capacity, production varies with (and is equal to) demand, and contribution is integrated
as in equation 1 below. We add together the expected contribution from both cases and
subtract costs.

Thus, the expected value received calculated over the assumed

distribution of demand levels is equal to
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For the remaining calculations, we use the following notation:
Target percentile (Row 5 in Figure 3, for calculating critical fractile) T = 1 – C/M;
Optimal capacity = -1D (T), where -1D denotes the inverse cumulative normal
distribution over D. (Row 8 in Figure 3)
Q = quantity produced to meet demand = min(D, K);
The annual profit π for given demand and capacity, where π = MQ – F – KC;
Since there is a 1-T chance that demand will exceed capacity, the expected annual
production for the optimal capacity (Row 21 in Figure 3) is given by:
2)

K

E(Q) = (1  T ) K  xf D ( x)dx


This is calculated straightforwardly in the spreadsheet (rows 10-18 in Figure 3
calculate the linear loss type of integral in Equation 2).
Then we can write the expected profit as:
3)

E(π) = ME(Q) – F – KC.
If the demand distributions used are unbiased, expected loss compared to the ex-

post optimal capacity depends only on the standard deviation of the demand forecast. So
if P1 has a normal distribution on D with standard deviation 1 and P2 has the same mean
as P1 but has standard deviation reduced to 2, the expected value of the contemplated
change would be E[π| standard deviation = 2] – E[π|standard deviation = 1].
We assumed normal distributions around variables and entered means and
standard deviations to the spreadsheet. We were able to structure variations with additive
or multiplicative relationships between variables so that, as uncertainty about vehicle
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demand propagated to uncertainty about part demand, D would continue to follow a
normal distribution3. The spreadsheet template proved flexible.
Input data for the spreadsheet models
In obtaining numerical inputs for our models, i.e., assessment, we were interested
in not only future costs, but uncertainty levels for a stream of products whose details were
not yet defined. Under these conditions, we could not rely on standard DA assessment
questions that involve subjective probability judgments about specific events. Keeping in
mind that we are aiming for order-of-magnitude type VOC results, we hoped it would
suffice to sample the future decision space by detailing typical situations that might occur
and running calculations for them. As earlier, it helped that we had access to the
forecasts and results for past product decisions. In most cases, we had no reason to think
that conditions had substantially changed and we assumed that a sampling of past
conditions would be a reasonable proxy with which to simulate future conditions. To
obtain base case assumptions about contribution margins relative to cost, we used as a
representative vehicle (or part) one whose parameters fell near the median or mean of the
range observed for the family of decisions toward which the change was targeted.
Often, the most critical parameter in our spreadsheet model was the standard
deviation on the volume forecast. We gave this parameter the most detailed attention and
3

Value of information results should be robust to the exact choice of distribution as

long as the same percentile is used, since for given mean and standard deviation the value
of information calculated with the linear loss integral is bounded (e.g., by Chebyshev’s
inequality). If a distribution were clearly characterized by rare but major events, it would
be preferable to build that into the model, as we did in one case.
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our assessments drew on various empirical data. There were prior GM research studies on
forecast error, including one which compared forecast error for major vs. minor vehicle
changes. In some cases, we looked at old planning forecasts and uncertainty ranges given,
the assumptions used in those forecasts, and how they compared with what actually
occurred. There was not enough for formal distribution fitting, but there was enough to
draw some rough conclusions. We conferred with GM internal staff who conducted
product decision analyses, and when necessary with the planners and decision makers
who provided their inputs.
We assigned probability distributions for hypothetical situations, e.g., if we had a
major change to the C-platform sports car, and what would be the uncertainty in the
forecast, what would be split between the lower and higher demand body styles. In most
cases, this worked something like it did for CR1, described shortly. For simplicity, we
often assigned normal distributions (suitable for forecast errors) with standard deviations
approximated to multiples of 10% of the mean, e.g., 0% for no uncertainty, 10% of mean
for low uncertainty, 50% for high uncertainty. These numbers were assigned by trained
decision analysts (in the role of experts), but were not assessed using special DA
techniques, and we based these estimates on data from similar previous situations.
The effect of CRs was typically to incorporate information about forecasts, splits,
and even levels of uncertainty that ought to already be available. For this reason, we were
not faced with difficult to assess subjective distributions. Instead, the post-change states
were characterized simply as good practice, e.g., facts which should be known were
assumed to be known, and forecast errors were assumed to be at the level that the
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company should achieve when the process worked correctly. The pre-change states were
the post-change states compromised by the various errors we described.
In the product plans we reviewed, cost of capacity and contribution margins were
provided primarily by accounting and finance, demand forecasts were provided primarily
by product managers. Uncertainty in those forecasts was usually articulated in the form of
10th, 50th and 90th percentiles that GM analysts obtained from product managers.
Mathematical models of the CRs
As we shall see in the four illustrative CRs, a few basic variations could be
applied in combination to adapt the template to our VOC models. The numbers are
disguised. Fixed costs were the same under P1 and P2, and so are not included in the
calculations of VOC. In the newsvendor-based VOC models for the specific CRs
described here, capacity cost parameters and contribution margins were treated as
deterministic.
CR1: This change requirement is directed at improved estimates on vehicle
demand for new programs in particular, as these have the most risk. The focus on new
programs affects the estimates of parameters involved and is relevant to determining the
frequency with which decisions affected by the change occur. To model its impact, we
utilized the spreadsheet template, and incorporated the assumption that the actual demand
for a given vehicle will be equal to the forecast demand plus a normally distributed error
term. The company must decide how much capacity to acquire. The cost terms here are
at the vehicle level (fixed cost for capacity, unit cost for capacity, contribution margin,
etc). We looked at several representative vehicles to estimate these numbers, including
one where an inaccurate forecast had actually led to problems.
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We first estimated the standard deviation of the error without further
improvement – where the decision maker fails to use the best forecast that combines
views from around the company. For this, we estimated a baseline error for standard
vehicles (where assumptions are better shared, and where there was some expertise
within the company even about the level of uncertainty in the forecasts). We then
qualitatively estimated the size of potential errors for other types of vehicles, by looking
at empirical data showing the variation among parties’ forecasts and between these
forecasts and the eventual sales that actually occurred for historical examples.
We assumed that with the improved estimation process, the decision maker
rightly uses a standard error more like that for most other vehicles. The decision maker’s
distribution is centered on the correct mean under the new process, but not necessarily
under the original process, and we compare the expected value obtained under the
assumption that the initial process had an unbiased estimate for the mean (P1a), or where
it was assumed too low (P1b) or too high (P1c).For P1a, P1b and P1c, the assumptions for C,
M, E(D) and σ(D) were entered in cells C3,C4, C6 and C7 of the template shown in
Figure 3, while K and E(π) are calculated in cells C8 and C22; assumptions and
calculations for P2 are in the same rows of column D, and VOC is calculated in cell C23.
Thus, P1a has the correct mean and the wrong standard deviation on demand, and P1b and
P1c have not only the wrong standard deviation but also the wrong mean, while P2has the
correct mean and standard deviation.
CR1

C

M

E(D)

σ(D)

K

P1a

$1000

$5000

100,000

50,000

142,000 $355,378,000

$9,467,000

P1b

$1000

$5000

80,000

50,000

122,000 $364,775,000

$30,000
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E[π(K)|P2]

VOC

P1c

$1000

$5000

120,000

50,000

162,000 $337,455,000 $29,360,000

P2

$1000

$5000

100,000

25,000

121,000 $364,805,000

–

Given the large standard deviation and high margin, this situation would typically
result in a lot of extra capacity. In case P1b, where the original forecast is below expected
demand, the capacity at the critical fractile happens to be near the correct capacity under
P2 (because the high standard deviation leads to inflated capacity on high margin
products), so then the ex-post value of the change is low.
CR2: The original CR referred to the fact that targets for vehicle production were
being treated as requirements for parts production. To model this situation, we interpret
the change requirement as meaning that a new decision rule should be specified. We
assume that without the change, the decision rule takes the mean of the true input
distribution on the quantity of a part that will be required. It treats this mean as a point
estimate without uncertainty, and sets an optimal capacity for this point estimate. We
calculate the expected value of this production level and compare it to the expected value
for the proposed new decision rule: treat the point estimate as having the uncertainty it
actually does, and set the optimal capacity for that distribution. The change will not
reduce standard deviation in forecast distributions, but will change how the distribution is
utilized. The value added here relates to value of information, but is not exactly the same
–value is added by using information correctly, not merely by acquiring information.
We selected a representative part, e.g., a high-markup option such as sunroofs,
and estimated F and C for the production of that part. The contribution margin for the
part is the difference between the premium we charge for a vehicle with that part

20

(alternatively, the amount by which we would have to discount a vehicle if the part were
not available) and the variable cost of producing that part. The as-is decision rule is
modeled as: K = E(D). The to-be decision rule finds the optimal capacity given that
standard deviation on demand for the part is σ, using our template.
E(D)

σ(D)

CR2 C

M

K

E[π(k)| P2]

P1

$600

$2400 175,000 0

P2

$600

$2400 175,000 52,500 210,411 $274,960,000

VOC

175,000 $264,733,000 $10,227,000
–

We assumed F = 0 (because capacity is outsourced). Under P2, K targets the 75 th
percentile of demand. VOC is positive even though the expected utilization of the plant
is lower for the new K derived under P2 than the K derived under P1, i.e., 79.4% vs.
88%. The VOC here is for a decision about a high-priced option. Most parts are cheaper.
We expected decisions on approximately five such high-priced options per year.
CR3: This CR mandates that information about the relative demand for different
body-styles be timely and complete. To model this CR, we assumed that under the
current system, North American Operations capacity planning ultimately formulates its
own estimates about how many units of each body-style are needed. This estimate is
based on the mean and standard deviation (15%) from BDSC’s forecast over the demand
summed over both body styles. We considered a specific example of 4-door (style a) vs.
3-door body (style b) minivans.
Under P1, manufacturing makes an uninformed guess that there is a 50%–50%
split among body-styles a and b, and makes a capacity decision for style. Under P2, the
estimated split is 60% for style a, and 40% for style b.
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Again, we targeted the 80th percentile. Note, identical values of C, M and F were
used for CRs 1, 3 and 4, because for the relevant vehicles, these were approximately
correct and we saw no reason to change the sample case more than necessary. For other
CRs that were most relevant to vehicles with relatively low margins, different parameter
values were used.
From the viewpoint of P2, P1 gets the critical fractile wrong and yields a high
probability of shortfall on vehicle type a, and low expected utilization on vehicle type b.
CR3

C

M

E(D)

σ(D)

K

E[π(K)| P2]

VOC

for

vehicle type
P1a

$1000

$5000

120,000

15%

150,298 $298,362,000

$17,166,000

P1b

$1000

$5000

120,000

15%

150,298 $128,048,000

$15,637,000

P2a
P2b

$1000
$1000

$5000
$5000

144,000
96,000

15%
15%

180,358 $315,528,000
120,239 $143,685,000

TOTAL a +b
$32,803,000

CR4: The issue here is that the more radical the change in a vehicle from its
predecessor, the more uncertainty there is about its demand. Some vehicles represent
updated versions of older products, while other vehicles are entirely new. Instead of
assuming that the standard deviation on the sales forecast is always the historical 30%, an
improved approach would allow decision makers to customize forecast distributions to
the type of vehicles. For example, vehicles that are essentially unchanged have lower
standard deviation (perhaps 10%), and radically new vehicles have higher standard
deviation (perhaps 50%). We calculated P1, assuming that the standard deviation σ is
30% of mean demand. Holding expected sales constant, we calculated P2a assuming σ is
10% and P2b assuming it is 50%.
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Here we calculated capacities as before, and computed profit levels for both types
of vehicles.
CR4

C

M

E(D)

σ(D)

K

E[π(K)| P2]

VOC

for

each case
P1

P2a
P2b

$1000

$1000
$1000

$5000

$5000
$5000

150,000

150,000
150,000

30%

10%
50%

187,873

162,624
213,122

a-$361,988,000

$17,015,000

b-$288,527,000

$6,487,000

$379,003,000
$295,014,000

–

Several others versions of the model developed along the same lines, and
illustrate how a wide variety of changes might translate to template models. For example,
one major part came in two styles, one of which appeared in about 60% of vehicles and
the other in 40% of vehicles. Faulty communication occasionally led to larger capacity
being committed for the wrong version. This was equivalent to having a 5% chance of
using the wrong assumption for mean volume for the two parts (P1) and the rest of the
time using the right assumption (P2), and VOC was thus 5% of the decreased profit for an
instance when the mistake occurred.
Another CR was to consider uncertainty about the mix of demand at the brand
level conditionally for each body type (P2), as opposed to just calculating body type split
and brand mix independently and multiplying the percentages to get the demand for each
specific vehicle (P1. The reasoning is that different option packages would be required
for each combination (e.g., sunroof with the exciting two-door Pontiac, no sunroof with
the four-door Pontiac or with any Chevrolet). Thus, there is more uncertainty about
demand under P2 than P1, and for a high markup item, more capacity is appropriate.
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Other CRs could allow improved information about contribution margins, or other
variables that we treat as fixed in our basic model.
Lifecycle value of change
To scale up from VOC on one decision to VOC across all affected decisions, an
enumerative approach would have been to list all such decisions and redo the model for
each of them. In our situation – and we suspect in most real ones – even if it had been
possible to name each future decision, there would not have been time to model them all.
Instead, we analyzed a single decision in-depth for which the change is hoped to produce
its benefit, e.g., setting production capacity for sports car spoilers. We estimated the VOC
for an instance of that decision and then surveyed the classes of decisions that would go
through the same process and that we expected to have similar benefits as a proportion of
spending involved (this is key to defining the relevant set of affected decisions). This
approach matched how GM organized its production scheduling systems, so obtaining
these numbers was straightforward.
For parts decisions, we factored in the number of parts per vehicle model that
would be affected by a change. From the type of program (e.g., sports car production) we
determined the set of affected vehicles. We asked how many times per year new
programs of this type occur. We asked how many years the change would benefit a new
program, e.g., the current process could be self-correcting for the relevant programs, so
that an imbalance only would apply for one year (which was common), or an imbalance
once created might persist throughout the life of the program. Finally, we recognized that
decisions for different products involving the same type of decision may have costs and
quantities that are lower or higher by some amount than the specific case we analyzed.
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With simple arithmetic, we combined all these into a factor representing the number of
equivalent decisions by which to scale up the single decision’s VOC to get a lifecycle
VOC.

4. Results
Impact
We summarized the results for all the VOC models (not just CR1-CR4) in a
portfolio-analysis type dashboard as in Table 1. We could easily think about the cost of
changes in terms of person days. We informally weighed costs against value. Based on
their payoffs, we designated the changes as having high, medium or low priority. Senior
management accepted these recommendations, and implementation teams were assigned
with guidelines that fleshed out the formal CR definitions.
The VOC models had benefits beyond prioritization. In some cases, the
requirements were further refined as a result of insights that were directly due to these
models. In CR1, for instance, we added guidance about when the value of improved
information is high and hence when that information should be required. For CR4, we
added to the original requirement the direction to ensure that forecasts make explicit
which sources of uncertainty have and have not been incorporated, and that large
downsides or upsides be noted separately. Many other CRs were also enhanced this way.
In some cases, the decision rules embedded in VOC calculations were not just sources to
inform the definition of CRs, but served as prototypes to potential solutions for those
CRs. For example, the company could make better use of critical fractile methods that
comprehend uncertainty in setting the amount of flexible capacity needed, and in setting
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various other capacity levels. In other cases, variables with high value information
themselves (and thus topics for future corporate research) were identified, e.g., a need to
understand how the price elasticity of demand for various options differs by body style.
We can assess the ultimate impact of this effort within the context of the BPR
effort as well as within the broader corporate context. The modeling phase of the project
ended at the point that the implementation of changes began. As such, the modeling effort
played a crucial role in selecting which changes to pursue. Beyond driving
recommendations, the detailed models aided in understanding and articulating to the
various stakeholders the reasons why one change or another would pay off more, thus
facilitating consensus about how to move forward.
Quantitative benefits: The direct benefit of this project was in the form of
improved estimates of the annual value that changes would provide, and the use of these
estimates to prioritize changes. It was difficult to prioritize these changes without the
quantitative model results. Thus, as a rough approximation, without this work all the
changes from this set were equally likely to have been in the high-priority group as the
low-priority group (which were not implemented until two or more years later). Because
of the improved estimates, GM would benefit from the high valued changes instead of the
average changes over two years between the implementation of the first and second
round of changes. By this reasoning (Keisler 2004b), the value added by our
prioritization was on the order of $100M. This figure assumes that our value estimates
were reasonably accurate (as the board of key leaders seemed to agree). We performed at
least some analysis on one third of the CRs. About half the entire set of CRs had effects
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on decisions that were easily enough articulated that this approach could plausibly have
been used.
Qualitative benefits: As we look back on the project several years later, the
changes that were thought to be important appear to have really been so. The large-scale
BPR effort was a major success. The insights and implications of VOC modeling clearly
contributed to elements of that success.
Key leaders Pat Jansen, Senior Manager, Capacity Planning and Richard Willson
Director of Manufacturing Planning at GM described the benefits realized from the
improvements to the decision process:
“System improvements have been identified and implemented to correctly
translate and communicate program intent into the detailed level required by
Purchasing. This active management of supplier tooling rates has resulted in
fewer constraints at new product launch due to early attention to flexibility
requirements and product mix. … Savings in overall tooling investment [had
been] documented and the potential for over-tooling due to poor communication
has been minimized.”
Brian Hagen (at that time the lead partner from Strategic Decisions Group, Inc., on the
BPR initiative) confirms the criticality of VOC modeling to the overall effort:
“The "Value of Change" approach provided a significant breakthrough on the
project as it helped our project team simplify our characterization of the link
between strategic change and corporate value creation. Ultimately, the approach
allowed the project team to pinpoint the sources of value resulting from change,
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more easily prioritize recommendations, and explain – in simple terms – the
impact of recommended changes to a senior level executive team.”
This effort provided a language for improving the definitions and describing the effects
of changes, and for deciding implementation priorities. It generated significant direct
value in the form of a focused implementation plan, and it generated indirect value by
making the reasons for the recommended changes more transparent to the rest of the
organization.
Lessons learned
Some of our tactics were improvised to the specific situation we faced, with both
constraints and resources that practitioners might not always have. Specifically, we
benefited from having organizational memory about DA. Certainly, if practitioners have
a similar resource, they should use it. On the other hand, we undertook a large analytic
project without realizing how much modeling work would have to be done in a short
time, so the focus on rapid model development might not be as great in other cases.
We can also draw some general lessons. First, we now know that it is feasible to
apply value of information to the design of organizational information systems and
decision processes. It remains for others to demonstrate that this can be done for more
subtle system design questions that would require more finely tuned analysis. In a
realistic setting, the dimensionality of the problem may be too great to create
comprehensive models.
Several shortcuts, concepts and insights seem generally helpful to push our
approach through to a successful conclusion in any setting. It was productive to integrate
BPR and DA methods, as the former are well-suited to mapping processes and defining
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changes. Classic elements of concurrent engineering facilitate this, i.e., team members
had shared, multiple and requisite skills, and planned interactions structured to ensure
feedback and feed-forward. To support DA, process mapping should explicitly address
decision points and information that flows into them. DA cannot dominate this step.
Instead, managers must define the changes and cluster them around certain decision
points. The analyst then translates these changes into DA models. Representing different
changes with separate models for separate decisions keeps the task simpler than trying to
create a unified simulation of the entire organization. If the BPR is focused on a set of
related decisions, some common structure – such as the newsvendor problem – will
probably facilitate rapid creation of many similar models.
To translate from verbal descriptions to quantitative models of changes, we
formulate from the problem description a typical DA model that a decision maker might
use. We track the flow of information from its origin to the decision maker’s final use of
it. Specifically, we focus on characterizing the amount of uncertainty in key parameters
such as demand forecasts and on how much of uncertainty can be reduced merely by
removing rather specific sources of noise or confusion in the organization so that the best
available information will be used at the most opportune time. It is important to identify
carefully the categories of future decisions that are affected by the change, to then tally
the benefits of the change over that stream. We know that the results from this approach
can at best be only approximate, but that VOI may often be robustly estimated and
applied – and produce insight – even if the core decision model is inexact.
The concept of VOI (and VOC) turns out to be a useful tool for improving
decision processes, not just individual decisions. By understanding when information is
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valuable, we can help organizations sort through the glut of information they possess.
Many in-house decision analysts or richly embedded consulting teams could adapt this
approach to resolving systemic organizational problems they observe. By quantifying the
impact of these organizational changes, we gain ability to plan and implement them.
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Figure 1: Map of information flows (simplified)
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Figure 2 Generic influence diagram for newsvendor type parts capacity decisions
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Figure 3: Value-of-change spreadsheet template (illustrative values).

A
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Fixed cost (F)
Unit cost of capacity (C)
Unit contribution (M)
Target percentile (T)
Demand mean [E(D)]
Demand Std Dev
Optimal capacity (K)
Nominal profit
Nominal extra capacity
Standardized extra capacity
Stdized prob density of D at K
Cumulative probabilty of D at K
Right tail std hazard of D at K
Left tail std hazard of D at K
E(D) | D < K
E(D) | D > K
Pr(D < K)
Expected unused capacity
Expected utilization
Expected quantity
Expected profit
VOC

B
Calculation of P2 View
10000000
250
1000
=1-C3/C4
130000
39000
=NORMINV(C5,C6,C7)
=C4*C8-C3*C8-C2
=C8-C6
=C10/C7
=NORMDIST(C11,0,1,0)
=NORMDIST(C11,0,1,1)
=C12-C11*(1-C13)
=C12+C11*C13
=C8-C7*C15/C13
=C8+C14*C7/(1-C13)
=C13
=C8-(C8*(1-C18)+C18*C16)
=(C8-C19)/C8
=C20*C8
=C4*C21-C3*C8-C2
=C22-E22
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C
P2 View
$
10,000,000
$
250
$
1,000
75%
130,000
39,000
156,305
$
107,228,825
26,305
0.674
0.318
0.750
0.149
0.824
113,476
179,573
75%
32,122
79.4%
124,183
$
75,106,714
$
4,737,081

D
E
P1 View
$ 10,000,000
Calculations
$
250 using capacity
$
1,000
from P1,
75%
demand
150,000
distribution
67,500
from P2
195,528
$ 136,646,044
45,528
65,528
0.674
1.680
0.318
0.097
0.750
0.954
0.149
0.019
0.824
1.699
121,400
126,023
235,800
211,636
75%
95%
55,596
66,276
71.6%
66.1%
139,932
129,252
$ 81,050,081 $ 70,369,633

Table 1 Results for portfolio of possible changes (illustrative values)
Change
requirement

Typical
Annual value of change
beneficiary
per application
(*disguised)
Sportarama* $10M-$50M (key
assumption is that
higher quality forecasts
could be used and differ
from brand forecasts up
to 20%)

Frequency

Annual
value

All new programs
(3-5 per year)

$100M

2 Clear
direction to
purchasing
regarding
options

Most
vehicles

Recover after 2
years. Applies to
most programs
(10 per yr)

$40M

3 More
detailed
truck/van
split info

Mini-vans
3rd vs. 4th
door

Savings on tooling of
$10M per program per
year, if it is true that
purchasing currently
uses expected demand
as capacity, options are
40% of tooling cost.
$30M (key assumption
is that plug used for
assembly decision is off
by about 10%.

Maybe important
for one program
per year, can
recover within 1-2
years at some cost.

$15M

4 Brand /
body style
specific
distributions

Chevy 999*
carryover
has less
uncertainty
than new
segment

$10M

Every program,
$50M
but value of
change will vary – Medium
lower if program is priority
typical or lower
contribution

1 BDSC
communication

5 through 20
would be
shown on
later pages
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High
priority

Medium
priority

Low
priority

